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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to stimulate new thinking about the role of the 
humanisation of the person to be sentenced. By rendering the person’s offending 
more comprehensible, humanisation is assumed to obstruct harsh penal treatment 
and mechanical case-disposal. Distinctively, however, this article argues that 
“humanisation work” also achieves profound latent effects. By resolving the potential 
threat of a person’s own account appearing to be at odds with her formal admission 
of guilt (e.g. guilty plea), humanisation work enables efficient case-disposal. Applying 
Douglas’ work on purity and pollution, and with empirical illustrations, I show how 
the “dirty work” of humanising the person to be sentenced cleanses cases of troubling 
ambiguities, making punishment easier to impose with confidence. Nevertheless, 
humanisation work can, especially if the communicative distance between sentencer 
and the person sentenced is reduced, also be a facilitator of inclusive and empathic 
penal sentiments. 
Key words 
Sentencing; humanisation; guilty pleas; punishment; court efficiency; mitigation; 
Mary Douglas; dirty work 
Resumen 
El objetivo de este artículo es suscitar un nuevo planteamiento sobre el papel de la 
humanización de la persona que va a ser sentenciada. Al volver la ofensa de la 
persona algo más comprensible, se supone que la humanización impide el mal trato 
penal y la gestión mecánica del caso. Lo característico del artículo, sin embargo, es 
su argumento de que el “trabajo de humanización” también surte profundos efectos 
latentes. Al resolver la amenaza potencial de que el relato de una persona aparezca 
en contradicción con su admisión formal de culpa (por ej., declararse culpable), el 
trabajo de humanización posibilita una disposición eficaz del caso. Aplicando el 
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trabajo de Douglas sobre pureza y polución, y con ilustraciones empíricas, muestro 
cómo el “trabajo sucio” de humanizar a la persona que va a ser sentenciada depura 
las ambigüedades problemáticas del caso, de forma que se puede imponer el castigo 
con confianza. No obstante, el trabajo de humanización también puede facilitar 
sentimientos penales inclusivos y empáticos, sobre todo si se reduce la distancia 
comunicativa entre el que sentencia y el que va a ser sentenciado. 
Palabras clave 
Sentenciar; humanización; declaración de culpabilidad; castigo; eficacia judicial; 
mitigación; Mary Douglas; trabajo sucio 
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1. Humanisation Work 
The purpose of this article is to stimulate new thinking about the work which 
humanisation does in the criminal (especially sentencing) process. I will propose that 
in addition to its explicit purpose. Humanisation work generates latent effects, which 
are essential to the perceived legitimacy of the act of punishment.  
What is “humanisation work”? “Humanisation work” takes different forms in different 
systems. However, by using the generic term “humanization work” I seek to draw 
the reader’s attention to its common functions. “Humanisation work” in the 
sentencing process1 refers to the collaborative practices which offer the prospect of 
and/or undertake the humanisation of the person to be punished, so that the 
sentencing court can better understand and relate to her as a whole human being. 
The explicit purpose of humanisation is to render the offending comprehensible 
(though not excusable) in the context of the person’s life. The work of humanisation 
makes it possible to understand the person as a whole, so challenging the tendency 
simply to condemn, vilify and exclude her. Humanisation work includes the processes 
of actual, promised and potential attention to: the person as a whole human being in 
context; her personal and social circumstances; her unique life-story; her voice; the 
possibility and actuality of mitigation; the examination of her character as a whole; 
her story of the offence; and crucially, her attitude towards her culpability and the 
authority of the court. Importantly, I will show that “humanisation work” incorporates 
both the actual and anticipated means of gathering information to understand and 
depict the person in relation to the offence. This work of humanisation is carried out 
differently in different countries and varies between inquisitorial and adversarial 
regimes. Yet all penal systems require this work. I will argue, however, that in 
carrying out these roles, humanisation work achieves a more profound output. It 
cleanses cases of troublesome ambiguities which would otherwise be seen to sully 
the perceived legitimacy of the penal act. Humanisation work purifies cases of their 
ambiguous features, (especially about the person’s views about their culpability and 
attitude towards the authority of the court), which, if ignored would imperil the 
efficient disposal of cases.  
1.2. Humanisation Versus Efficiency? 
In contrast to conventional thinking, I will argue that the work of humanisation tends 
to assist, rather obstruct, the efficient delivery of punishment and case-disposal. Let 
me explain. Typically, efficiency and humanisation are viewed as mutually 
contradictory (cf e.g. Heimer 2001). Albeit with different normative leanings, both 
policy and academic thinking regard efficiency and humanisation as opposing values, 
operating in a trade-off with each other: the more humanisation the less efficiency 
and vice versa. The question becomes, therefore, where the correct “balance” 
between the two ought to be struck. Policy thinking, influenced as is it is by 
managerial and instrumentalist assumptions, tends to deride humanisation as 
somewhat superfluous, impeding the swift, economic and efficient throughput of 
cases (Bottoms 1995, Tata 2007a).  
Meanwhile, a recurring anxiety in much academic work is that sentencing is, in 
reality, too governed by the mechanistic values of efficiency, automation and speed. 
Particularly in the lower and intermediate courts, too little attention is thought to be 
paid to the circumstances and social context of the unique individual, human being 
to be sentenced (e.g. Hagan et al. 1979, Rosecrance 1988, Newman and Ugwudike 
2013, Ward 2016). Against this back-drop, the process of depicting the defendant as 
a whole and unique person (conducted in nominally adversarial systems in the period 
                                                 
1 In this article the focus of humanisation work is restricted to the sentencing process – the formal decision 
to punish. This is not to deny that humanisation work occurs throughout the criminal justice process (from 
police stages through to implementation of the sentence), and there is potential to compare how this is 
done. However, since sentencing is recognised as the moment which determines and justifies the violence 
and to be done to the person, humanisation is central to the legitimation of practices both after, and 
indeed prior to, sentencing. 
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between conviction and sentencing), is seen as an important, humanising corrective 
(e.g. Newman and Ugwudike 2013). By enquiring and informing the sentencing judge 
about the person, her human story can be told in its context, enabling more rounded 
judgement to be made, thus complicating and obstructing the possibility of harsh 
punishment. Contextualising the offence and humanising the person to be sentenced, 
pre-sentence investigation and mitigation may enable the judge come to see the 
offending as explicable (though not excusable), so rendering the imposition of harsh 
punishment more difficult (e.g. Raynor 1990, Gelsthorpe et al. 2010, Carr and 
Maguire 2017). By humanising the person, the sentencing court can be provided with 
“an account which enables the court to see an offence as intelligible human action, 
however deplorable, in the context of the individual circumstances” (Canton and 
Dominey 2018, p. 88).  
So the following sorts of concerns commonly surface among those concerned about 
the march of efficiency. Does work to humanise the person to be sentenced tend to 
be glossed over by a court impatient to move onto the next case. Does humanisation 
really impact on case outcomes, or, is it mere empty ceremony? Are the demands of 
efficient case disposal bound to bulldoze attendance to the unique human being? 
Underlying these questions is the widespread belief that humanisation and 
“organizational efficiency” are “inversely related” (Hagan et al. 1979, 509) or that 
humanisation is more ceremonial than real (Rosecrance 1988). 
However, not all work regards efficiency and humanisation as necessarily 
irreconcilable. Suggesting instead that humanisation can generate greater 
compliance with authority and so yield efficient case-processing, Procedural Justice 
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence offer a rosier outlook of what is possible. Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence (TJ) (e.g. Winnick and Wexler 2003) and Procedural Justice (PJ) are 
each, and in their own ways, concerned that humane treatment should be 
communicated to those subject to the legal process (e.g. defendants) (e.g. Tyler and 
Huo 2002, Tyler 2003; see also Elek 2019 [in this issue]). TJ and PJ focus on how 
humanisation can be reassuring to, even (especially for TJ), empowering those 
subject to law. It enables them to see for themselves that the punishment is, in fact, 
“fair enough” (e.g. Schinkel 2014). For advocates of PJ, those subject to law’s 
violence can see for themselves that the process is fair: it enables their free 
participation; treats them with dignity as an unique individual; it shows that it attends 
carefully to their version of events; demonstrates to them that justice personnel are 
motivated by a concern for them and can be trusted, etc. Rather than mindlessly 
processing people and so disempowering and degrading them, through free 
participation, the person’s encounter with the authority the authority of the court can 
not only be dignified (as in PJ), but empowering. This can aid her willingness and 
ability to comply with the requirements of the court. TJ and PJ argue that 
humanisation values can convert the efficiency versus humanisation zero-sum game 
into a win-win.  
While both PJ and TJ propose a way of out of the efficiency-versus-humanisation 
bind, they nonetheless remain conventional in the object of their focus. In common 
with most policy and academic literature, PJ and TJ concentrate almost exclusively 
on what humanisation does to and for defendants, victims and others whose fates 
are determined by justice officials. This is in-line with the focus of academic enquiry 
on the potential of humanisation either to empower and include (as PJ and TJ would 
like to see it), or, to disempower and degrade them (e.g. Garfinkel 1956, Carlen 
1976, McConville et al. 1994, Newman 2012). Thus, thinking to-date has tended to 
adopt the point-of-view of professionals as the agents who impact upon the people 
as the objects they process. Importantly, much of this work in fact reads off from 
professional accounts what those subject to the courts feel. In other words, most 
research has tended to examine the experiences of people through the eyes of 
professionals dealing with them. The accounts which professionals give to 
researchers may be viewed by researchers with a benign or critical eye. This in turn 
gives rise to the hotly-debated as to whether professional treatment is empowering 
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or degrading. Yet by standing back from this debate we can see that both these 
friendly and critical traditions are preoccupied with what the process does for and to 
the people coming before the courts. Distinctively, this article relocates the gaze of 
enquiry. Rather than looking at what humanisation may do to those coming before 
the courts it asks instead: what does humanisation do for and to professionals, 
(especially lawyers and judges),2 who conduct and witness it?  
Even in the lower and intermediate courts, humanisation work is essential. Indeed, 
without humanisation work, the sense of the otherwise-empty routine operation of 
“efficient” assembly-line justice would be imperilled. In common with the arguments 
of PJ and TJ, the work of humanisation enables, rather than obstructs, expeditious 
case disposal. In contrast, however, to TJ and PJ, this article does not focus on what 
the work of humanising processes does to assuage the concerns of the recipients of 
legal decisions, but how a sense of humanisation assuages the potential anxieties of 
professionals who are responsible for fair process and just outcomes. While not 
disputing the claim that humanisation work may often achieve its explicit purpose to 
contextualise the person and her offending, I argue that humanisation work 
simultaneously achieves a second latent, but more profound, consequence.  
Humanisation work cleanses cases of their potentially noxious ambiguities. So, and 
in contrast to the efficiency-humanisation conundrum discussed earlier, the work of 
humanisation enables, rather than obstructs, expeditious case disposal. By 
conceiving of humanisation work as a collaborative activity which professional 
identities, beliefs and ideals of potentially adulterating influences, the article unearths 
what the work of humanisation does for and to legal professionals (especially judges 
and defence lawyers).  
Successful humanisation work purifies cases of their potentially polluting ambiguities 
which would threaten elevated professional beliefs and ideals. The article is illustrated 
with examples from research into the process of mitigation and the uses of pre-
sentence investigations and reports. The aim of the four year study, was to conduct 
a direct comparison between how sentencing judges interpret and use particular 
individual pre-sentence reports in intermediate court cases and what the writer of 
those same individual reports intended to convey. The research incorporated four 
elements. These were: 1. An ethnographic study of the construction of pre-sentence 
reports in two sites in Scotland deploying “shadow” report-writing in which the field-
based researcher prepared a “shadow” (i.e. mock) report based on the same 
information available to the pre-sentence report writer who prepared the real report. 
This enabled a comparison between the “shadow report and the real report and 
proved to be a particularly valuable way of eliciting what the report writer intended 
to convey (often implicitly) in specific parts of a particular report and the reasons for 
doing so. 2. An observational and interview court-based study of the use of these 
same (and other) cases, with interviews with the sentencing judges, defence lawyers 
and prosecutors. 3. A series of focus group discussions with intermediate court judges 
throughout Scotland discussing general and specific issues relating to specific pre-
sentence reports, including those already observed. The judges were sent the case 
papers in advance and asked to review them in the same way in which they normally 
would. 4. A series of moot sentencing hearings with pre- and post-interviews with 
                                                 
2 Generally speaking, in nominally adversarial systems, responsibility for investigating and attending to 
the unique individual defendant bears particularly heavily on defence lawyers and judges, typically assisted 
by pre-sentence investigators (who may be social workers, probation officers or others from a range of 
backgrounds). This is not to deny that prosecutors play a part, and indeed their humanising work may be 
more acute in nominally inquisitorial systems (see e.g. Field 2006, Hodgson 2006). 
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intermediate court judges and defence lawyers using anonymised case papers whose 
production and sentencing had already been observed.3  
1.3. Structure of the Article 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains that court professionals face a 
potential dilemma. On the one hand, as justice professionals, lawyers and judges are 
self-consciously aware of their personal responsibility in each case, and are bound to 
be acutely sensitive to the need to humanise punishment. Yet at the same time, court 
professionals feel obliged to dispose of cases as expeditiously as possible. That being 
so, Section 3 asks how judges and lawyers are able to dispose of cases relatively free 
from worries about fair process. Having explained the limitations of conventional 
explanations relying on an internal discourse of rationalisation or denial, Section 4 
initiates the concept of “case-cleansing”. Drawing on Mary Douglas’ social 
anthropology of the construction of ideas of purity and pollution, Section 4 argues 
that, where successfully accomplished, the work of humanisation cleanses cases of 
potentially threatening ambiguities. Particularly important is the defendant’s posture 
towards her own culpability for an offence to which she has formally pled guilty. Left 
unresolved such ambiguities threaten to pollute inviolable principles, including: the 
free participation of the defendant, the presumption of innocence, and conviction 
beyond reasonable doubt. Developing the concept of case-cleansing, I consider the 
role of social status and social distance. In many jurisdictions, the “dirty work” of 
case-cleansing conducted by humanisation work is delegated and re-delegated, 
distancing and refracting the voice of the person to be punished from the court. 
Concluding, Section 5 explains how humanisation work may not only contextualise 
the offence and offender, but through its case-cleansing solidify the social norms and 
collective identities of criminal court communities. Reflecting on the normative 
implications of this empirical conceptualisation, the article considers the effects of 
distancing and delegation in humanisation work and the value of closer 
communications in the conduct of humanisation work. 
2. Professional Responsibility and Potential Qualms 
A recurring preoccupation of judges and lawyers is the need to balance the 
mechanistic requirements of efficiency, speed and standardisation with a focus on 
upholding inviolable principles including the presumption of innocence, and free 
participation. As we saw earlier, in legal professional and academic discourse these 
ideas are seen to be mutually contradictory. It is normally taken as a self-evident 
truism that the more efficient the court process, the less fair it is and vice versa. A 
perennial anxiety is about how best to “balance” these two apparently competing 
virtues. In the work of the lower and intermediate criminal courts judges and lawyers 
are subject to expectations to “dispose efficiently” of cases as speedily and with as 
little effort as possible (e.g. Tata 2007a, Mack and Roach Anleu 2007, Roach Anleu 
and Mack 2017). This can lead to an awkward sense of justice becoming like an 
assembly line or factory with insufficient concern for the individual and her 
participation, thus querying the legitimacy of the process, being seen to imperil the 
precious liberal rule of law values to which they must subscribe (e.g. Morgan 2008). 
Lawyers and judges frequently complain of the pressures that they are under and 
their fears that the process is increasingly becoming a “factory”, “sausage-machine”, 
“assembly-line” or “cookie-cutter”, in which the demands of speed and 
standardisation crush the opportunity of the defendant to tell her story and be treated 
with humanity. For example, defence lawyers expresses a sense of awkwardness and 
                                                 
3 The main sources of data comprised transcripts of five separate focus groups with judges discussing 
specific cases; five moot sentencing exercise transcripts; 55 interview transcriptions comprising 22 pre-
sentence report writer follow-up interviews, 17 post-observed sentencing judge interviews, 11 one-to-one 
defence lawyer interviews, five moot pre- and post-observed sentencing interviews with defence lawyers, 
10 court observation diaries, 43 weekly fieldwork diary returns, 29 shadow reports and 29 original reports 
with their attached papers. The main research participants were: 22 report writers, 26 intermediate court 
judges and 11 defence lawyers. ESRC Award Number RB000239939. 
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a degree of embarrassment about the impact of extrinsic (e.g. legal aid) changes on 
their ability to spend time with clients and so relying on personal circumstance 
information gathered in the pre-sentence report (Tata 2007a, 2010). Tata (2007a) 
documents that most lawyers were willing to observe the deleterious impact of 
changes to payment structures on the work of other lawyers, but refused to 
countenance that these same changes had any negative impact on their own personal 
professional practice.  
However, some readers may wonder whether lawyers and judges are really subject 
to any misgivings about the fairness of the process they constitute. One view is that 
legal professionals more or less jettison acclaimed legal principles for expedient, 
cynical and self-interested motivations (e.g. McConville and Marsh 2014). So, the 
thinking goes that legal professionals replace: the presumption of innocence with the 
presumption of guilt (e.g. Sudnow 1965, Mulcahy 1994); the principle of free and fair 
participation with the overt pressuring of defendants; and the concern for the client’s 
best interest with the lawyer’s self-interest (e.g. Newman 2012). In that way, it could 
be supposed that judges and lawyers are subject to no potential qualms about the 
justice of the process they constitute because of they do not, in reality, hold to their 
vaunted professional values. 
However, it cannot be so simple. While professionals have to find ways to adapt and 
their ideals to the imperatives of daily reality, neither can they completely relinquish 
them without invalidating their own professional identity. Lawyers and especially 
judges have to be acutely conscious of their responsibility to some idea of justice. 
Simply to deny that would be to deny their own purpose, as well as their own moral 
and social elevation as “professionals”. Professional discourse holds the values of 
individual personal responsibility to be central (e.g. Marshall 1939, Sommerlad 
2015). This is why, for instance, lawyers and especially judges are acutely sensitive 
to criticism of the system they constitute, often seeming to take it personally, anxious 
to justify their personal practices (e.g. Tata 2007a, Jamieson 2019).  
This can be seen for example in the ways in which the potentially troubling practice 
of plea bargaining or negotiation is described. So central is the practice to the mass 
disposal of cases by way of guilty pleas that it poses questions about the presumption 
of innocence and free and fair participation. Judges and lawyers tend to be concerned 
to defend and justify their own practice. For instance, many tend to dislike the term 
“plea bargaining” since it may connote something vulgar, grubby, “underhand” or 
“seedy” (Flynn and Freiberg 2018, 19-21). Flynn and Freiberg (2018) report that 
judges were anxious to “‘put a more positive shine’ on the process”: “Using the word 
bargaining or deal implies that it’s almost a bit underhanded, or that it’s not a fair 
process or a fair outcome” (Defence lawyer, Flynn and Freiberg 2018, 21). Similarly, 
members of the judiciary tend to be somewhat ambivalent about the term “sentence 
discounting”, preferring more refined terms like “allowance” (Gormley and Tata 
forthcoming 2020). Such discomfort speaks, albeit in different ways, to a more 
general ambivalence or anxiety about such practices which could be seen to “trade” 
a guilty plea for some perceived benefit: “There’s nothing noble about this. It’s just 
a seedy little bargain that we enter into with criminals (…). It’s just not an ethically 
justifiable stance” (Brown 2017, 223).  
How is it possible for legal professionals to reconcile daily assembly-line practice with 
cherished legal principles? 
2.1. The Problem of Ambiguities 
The particular problem on which this paper focuses is that of formal admissions of 
guilt (in nominally adversarial systems, the formal plea of “guilty”), where they 
appear, in some way, to be contradicted, minimized, or equivocated by the 
defendant’s account. While it is well known that the lower and intermediate courts 
around the world rely on admissions of guilt, a straight, unambiguous denial of guilt 
may be unwelcome, but it does not, in itself, raise troubling questions of legitimacy. 
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However, what is more awkward and troubling is the non-ideal defendant whose 
position appears to query (explicitly or implicitly), the legitimacy of the process, so 
disrupting the smooth flow of case disposal. For example, her account to the court 
may be ambiguous or at odds with the formal plea; appears confused; explicitly or 
implicitly defiant (Weisman 2014); exculpatory; or tactical in some way, (e.g. 
Jacobson et al. 2015). This includes: the person who exhibits a contradictory (e.g. 
exculpatory), or, an insincere admission of guilt (e.g. Bottoms and McClean 1976), 
equivocal guilty plea (e.g. Weenink 2009, Bibas 2012) or, obvious disengagement, 
cynicism, reluctant conformity, or, “passive acceptance” (e.g. Weenink 2009, 
Jacobson et al. 2015); or, is palpably not an informed, rational decision-maker (e.g. 
struggling with addiction or other problems). For the admission to be consistent with 
the inviolable idea of a freely participating defendant who willingly admits guilt, the 
admission has to be seen by the court as free and sincere.  
Defendants who appear to be less than wholehearted in the formal admission of guilt; 
or whose account of their guilt seems contradictory; or, who suggest or imply 
pressure or outright coercion to admit guilt; or, whose posture appears to exude 
cynicism about the fairness of the process; or, who appears confused, in distress, or, 
unable to cope with or comprehend the process, all pose important challenges to the 
legitimacy of the process, which cannot be ignored (Weisman 2009, Martel 2010, 
Bandes 2015, van Oorschott et al. 2017). To ignore these implicit challenges would 
be to fail to address potential qualms about the fairness and legitimacy of the process. 
This portends the prospect of hesitation about the legitimacy of (and specifically the 
genuine consent to), a guilty plea in the instant case, and guilty pleas in general upon 
which the system depends.  
How are judges and lawyers reconciled to constituting a process, which could be 
regarded as falling short of what they themselves must hold as core ideals? Let us 
first consider the conventional way in which this problem tends to be explained as an 
internal discourse of self-justification. 
3. How are Potential Professional Qualms about the Fairness of the Process 
Managed? 
The first point to note is that we should not expect that expression of qualms about 
the legitimacy of the process to be vented openly. “The suppression of emotion and 
personal feelings is a key attribute of traditional conceptions of the profession” 
(Roach Anleu and Mack 2019 [in this issue], 7). Court professionals must learn when 
not to show signs of embarrassment or guilt to the court community. This is key to 
professional emotion work (e.g. Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, Bergman Blix and 
Wettergren 2018). Weisman (2014) points out that to do so, would engender group 
embarrassment and question loyalty to the group. Although writing about the 
showing of remorse by offenders and others, Weisman’s arguments can be adapted 
to court professionals: 
For a member to show remorse for actions that the [court] community has deemed 
honourable, or principled, or courageous is tantamount to betrayal just as the refusal 
to show remorse for actions that are viewed as heinous are occasions for collective 
moral outrage. (Weisman 2014, 16) 
So a key element in the craft of professional performance is learning whether, when 
and how to show signs of discomfort. In the collective and collaborative effort to 
“dispose” of cases expeditiously, doubt, awkwardness or embarrassment about the 
speed and cursory nature of proceedings should not normally be very apparent. To 
do so would be to be seen to query the social norms of the court community, and be 
seen as an act of disloyalty, a taboo. How are these potentially troubling feelings 
managed? First, I will outline the standard way of answering this question, premised 
as it is on individual self-justification, before offering a distinctive thesis about the 
cleansing work of humanisation.  
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3.1. Discourses of Denial and Rationalisation 
Existing work on how potentially troubling feelings are managed among criminal court 
professionals has tended to suggest that the potential discord between venerated 
ideals and the disappointing reality is explained through an internal individual 
dialogue of rationalization.  
Perhaps the most common resource in criminal justice for explaining how people 
avoid full responsibility for their wrongs was sketched out by Sykes and Matza in 
relation to “juvenile delinquents” more than sixty years ago (see also, for example, 
Presser 2003, Maruna and Copes 2005). Juvenile delinquents employ a range of 
techniques of neutralization and distancing (see also Cohen 2001; Bauman 1989, 
208-221 on “adiaphorisation”). In criminal justice work scholars have applied this 
idea to the work of court professionals. Tombs and Jagger (2006) argue that judges 
(like Sykes and Matza’s delinquents), seek to neutralize and justify their decisions to 
imprison: denying responsibility for their decisions; denying harm (only a summary 
case, previous imprisonment), and by condemning the condemners (e.g. the appeal 
court, academics and others unaware of the reality). Individual professionals can and 
do tell themselves and each other a range of justifications: “these are trivial, 
meaningless cases with negligible consequences”; “these defendants are really guilty 
criminals who are ‘in denial’’’; “they are tactically game-playing”; “too stupid to 
understand”; or, “that this is just my job and I am not really responsible” (e.g. 
Mulcahy 1994, Newman 2012). More generally, defence lawyers may, where their 
financial environment has radically altered, justify advising clients to take different 
decisions which the lawyer used to describe as unethical, by recasting case facts and 
employing a range meanings to explain the ethical “duty to serve the best interests 
of the client” (Tata 2007b).  
Yet while recognising that this justificatory talk forms part of the discourse of the 
lower and intermediate courts, such explanations are not, in themselves, be 
sufficient. Previous explanations of the “rationalizing” accounts of judges and lawyers 
(e.g. McBarnet 1981, Mulcahy 1994, McConville et al. 1994, Tombs and Jagger 2006) 
have tended to pay scant attention to the importance of the professional self-image 
of judges and lawyers.  
As justice professionals, lawyers and judges are bound to regard themselves as 
carrying a weight of duty in three ways. Firstly, judges and lawyers in the lower and 
intermediate courts are starkly reminded every day of the consequences of the 
desperate plight of people about whom they have to make penal decisions. They are 
faced with a relentless parade of human misery. As one sentencer put it: “If you’ve 
got any feelings at all, you’re seeing absolute misery passing in front of you day in, 
day out, month in, month out, year in, year out (…)” (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, 
19).  
Secondly, self-identifying as “professionals”, not “mere” business people, demands 
that judges and lawyers must make some reference to higher ethical and altruistic 
responsibilities incorporating valour, honour, public service, and duty to others 
(Sommerlad 2015), even if the ways that is done is contingent and indeterminate 
(Tata 2007a). This idea of being professional is typically understood by legal 
professionals as an immediate personal, individual responsibility (Abbott 1988, 
Sommerlad 2015).  
Thirdly, lawyers but especially judges are well aware of their responsibility as the 
practical custodians of justice. Even if sentencing is a collaborative process (e.g. Tata 
2007b), judges tend to read “the master narrative of judicial independence” as 
bringing a sense of a weight of individual, personal and inescapable responsibility 
(e.g. Jamieson 2019). The difficulty of sentencing lies in its uncertainty and the heavy 
consequences for the defendant (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017). 
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This triple sense of duty with which lawyers and especially judges, albeit in varying 
ways, must identify, means that the comparison with Sykes and Matza’s juvenile 
delinquents cannot be straightforward.  
While judges and lawyers can generally only express in relatively muted and subtle 
ways, qualms about the legitimacy of the process they constitute, they seek signs of 
reassurance from those subject to punishment. For example, court professionals 
observe the body language of the person to be sentenced not only in court, but as 
she or he leaves the court after sentencing to see whether or not there appear to be 
signs of acceptance. Indeed, there can be a tendency to revel in stories about those 
who, despite being punished not only accepted their punishment as deserved but 
praise the fairness of their treatment by the court. In interviews with researchers, 
judicial sentencers can be pleased to recall with quiet pride the manifested 
acknowledgement of their fairness, especially when they hear it directly from the 
person herself (e.g. Jamieson 2019, Tata 2019). In muted ways, judges observe their 
professional pride in the fairness of their sentencing. Commonly, courtroom 
professionals note how the person reacts to her sentence and judges may delight in 
recalling how despite receiving a heavy sentence, the person recognised verbally or 
non-verbally the fairness of the court. For example, a recurring motif of judicial 
recollection is the sentenced person who despite not being the subject of leniency is 
recalled nonetheless to accept of the fairness of the judge’s treatment: 
And interestingly when we were visiting [name of nearby] Prison they always asked 
them what their view of the sentence was. And mostly the view of the sentence is 
that it was ‘a fair enough sentence’, you know, standing back from it and those who 
considered that the sentence was fair were much more easily managed in the system 
than those who considered that the sentence was unfair. [Judge, Focus Group 6] 
Similarly, defence lawyers may take pride in describing how their rapport with their 
clients boosts client self-esteem (e.g. Tata 2010).  
In other words, justice professionals (lawyers and especially judges) seek signs that 
their work is fair. Fairness may and often is signaled by other professionals in the 
court community. However, the most potent and convincing sign that the court’s 
work has been fair is from the sentenced person’s own communication – both through 
non-verbal communication (e.g. their perceived posture to the court) and in the 
account the person appears to give about the offence and their view of the legitimacy 
of the process. .  
Thus, rationalisation through a self-justifying internal dialogue cannot, by itself, be 
sufficient for judges and lawyers to assuage the potential menace of ambiguity in the 
person’s posture towards the court compared to her formal plea. As well as an 
internal dialogue, more importantly and convincingly, as members of court 
communities, judges and lawyers participate in social, collective practices, which 
assuage, preventatively channel and largely head-off potential concerns.  
Let us now explore more fully the idea that humanisation work transforms and 
recreates apparently messy ambiguous defendant postures, cleansing them of their 
unsettling ambiguities. The threat of ambiguity and uncertainty about the true factual 
guilt and moral responsibility of the person to be sentenced is resolved through 
humanisation work, which shows the person as accepting his/her imminent 
punishment.  
4. Case-Cleansing 
Mary Douglas’ seminal anthropological account of purity and pollution can help us to 
understand the threat which ambiguous admissions of guilt pose and how this leads 
to the transformation (cleansing) of cases. Douglas (1966/2002) argues that dirt is 
not defined universally, nor, biologically driven. What any given community may 
regard as “dirty” is culturally generated idea. That which is regarded as dirty is 
socially defined. Dirt is that which offends what is seen as the natural order. “[D]irt 
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is essentially disorder (…). Dirt offends against order” (Douglas 1966/2002, 2) It is 
that which is out of place, which does not belong, which is discordant. For Douglas 
classification is a universal social urge not merely an individual cognitive need: 
In chasing dirt, in papering, decorating, tidying, we are not governed by our anxiety 
to escape disease, but are positively reordering our environment, making it conform 
to an idea. (Douglas 1966/2002, 3)  
Dirt is what offends certain key cherished, sacred ideas of order, classification and 
normality, which constitute the group. Dirt, in the form of unsettling ambiguity, 
pollutes and contaminates the purity of these ideas. Dirt is what does not fit into the 
group’s ontology: it is neither one thing nor the other. It threatens venerated, totemic 
ideas. To avoid endangering the purity of revered ideas, purity and dirt must be 
separated:  
In short, our pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea 
likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications (…). Defined in this way [dirt] 
appears as a residual category, rejected from our normal scheme of classifications 
(…). Discordant [cues] tend to be rejected. (Douglas 1966/2002, 45) 
Douglas (1966/2002, 47-8) argues that in practice anomaly and ambiguity are 
synonymous because they challenge and pollute cherished principles and categories. 
Applying this to the sentencing process, we can see that the person who formally 
admits guilt, but who, at the same time, appears to the court to minimise, deny, or 
whose narrated account appears to be at odds with that formal admission, threatens 
to pollute the clear distinction between categories of guilt as opposed to innocence, 
freedom of choice as opposed to coercion, participation and the presumption of 
innocence. Discussing Douglas’ thesis, Turner observes that liminis personae are 
almost always considered polluting: 
The concept of pollution ‘is a reaction to protect cherished principles and categories 
from contradiction’. [Douglas] holds that, what is unclear and contradictory (from the 
perspective of social definition) tends to be regarded as (ritually) unclean. The 
unclear is the unclean (…). From this standpoint one would expect to find that 
transitional beings are particularly polluting, since they are neither one thing nor 
another; or may be both; or neither here nor there or may be nowhere (…), and at 
the very least ‘betwixt and between’ all the recognized fixed points in space time 
structural classification. (Turner 1967, 97) 
The removal, or, cleansing of this contaminating dirt can be collectively cathartic, 
strengthening shared group bonds of belief and belonging. Cleansing is a way “to 
regain life – or strength – for an individual, a community, or an environment as a 
whole, and the purification rites, also known as cathartic rituals, have a major role 
to play in this”.4 
Humanisation work, which in nominally adversarial countries, is carried prior to 
sentencing, cleanses the case of its offensive, noxious, threatening features so that 
it is disposed in accordance with sacred legal ideals (e.g. freedom of choice; the 
presumption of innocence; participation in one’s own case; consistency balanced with 
attendance to the unique individual). Resistant / discordant narratives (e.g. denial of 
guilt; denial of true culpability; confusion or passivity) are translated and transformed 
into acceptable categories (e.g. unequivocal admission of guilt; participation; 
attendance to the unique individual).  
4.1. Delegation 
Typically in nominally adversarial countries this cleansing is done through delegated 
humanisation work. The case is then returned to the courtroom, having been 
cleansed of such ‘dirt’ and the person can then be seen to be punished with certainty 
and confidence. The person manifestly accepts her guilt, and ideally, is remorseful, 
                                                 
4 Perhaps it is instructive to note that “catharsis” is derived from the Greek catharsis: “to remove dirt or 
a blemish (katharma) for the purpose of making oneself, an object, or one’s environment pure (katharos)”. 
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in effect willing her own punishment. In this way, the natural order of the criminal 
process in which defendants willingly plead guilty, has been challenged but 
vindicated: the person willingly accepts her punishment.  
The stress and uncertainty of liminality means it must be time-limited. To transition 
the liminal defendant to the status of culpable offender requires that the discordant 
mess, the dirt has to be cleaned up. Here the concept of “dirty work” first sketched 
out by Hughes is useful. 
4.1.1. “Dirty Work” 
“Dirty Work” is work which is believed to be necessary, but obnoxious, repellent, 
demeaning (Hughes 1951), tainting and stigmatising “… those pariahs who do the 
dirty work for society are really acting as agents for the rest of us” (Hughes 1962, 
7).  
Dirty work refers to those aspects of their tasks that most workers would prefer not 
to do (…). Those who work in these occupations typically look for ways to neutralize 
stigma, ways to rationalise, justify, assuage, or explain their actions to others as well 
as themselves (…) [work that is] figuratively unclean.  
Hughes (1962, 6) notes that dirty work derives from an: 
[U]nwillingness to know unpleasant facts. That people can and do keep a silence 
about things whose open discussion would threaten the group’s conception of itself, 
and hence its solidarity, is common knowledge (…). To break such a silence is 
considered an attack against the group. 
Examples of “dirty work” include the work done by refuse collectors, butchers (e.g. 
Meara 1974, Simpson et al. 2011), funeral directors, psychiatric-related community 
decision-making (Brown 1989); probation officers (Mawby and Worrall 2013, see also 
Hochschild 1983). Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) develop Hughes’ concept that there 
are three kinds of dirty work: physical, social and moral, which taints the image of 
those doing that work. Physical taint refers to occupations associated with what is 
“tangibly offensive”, while:  
Social taint occurs where an occupation involves regular contact with people or 
groups that are themselves regarded as stigmatized (…). Moral taint occurs where 
an occupation is generally regarded as somewhat sinful or of dubious value. (Ashforth 
and Kreiner 1999, 416)  
We can conceive of the humanisation work of defence lawyers and pre-sentence 
report writers as carrying out social and moral dirty work, who develop ways of coping 
with occupational stigma. Mawby and Worrall (2013) focus on explaining enduring 
occupational identity among probation officers: the buffers, tactics and explanations 
they develop to manage and maintain positive self-image (e.g. Ashforth and Kreiner 
2014).  
4.1.2. The Re-Delegation of “Dirty Work”  
Dirty work tends to be delegated and re-delegated. Hughes (1958) suggests that 
delegation of dirty work from one group to another is “also a part of the process of 
occupational mobility.” Applying this point to the criminal process, we can think of 
the distancing of judges from direct discussion with and understanding of the 
defendants about plea, attitude to the charges, and the messiness of defendants’ 
lives.5 It authorises “the practice of legitimate violence, leaving unsoiled the hands 
of the person inflicting” (Garapon, Bien Juger, p. 81, cited in Hodgson 2006, 228). 
Except in the case of unrepresented defendants, this dirty work with defendants has 
over time been delegated from judges to defence lawyers (Horovitz 2007) and re-
delegated to pre-sentence report writers (Tata 2010), which in turn are being re-
                                                 
5 The endeavour of Problem-Solving Courts to encourage direct judicial-offender communication can be 
seen as an exception to this tendency towards delegation of dirty work. However, despite the considerable 
interest in this model, we should recall that such courts are very much the exception rather than the norm.  
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delegated from professional probation officers to the third sector, and self-employed 
casual workers (e.g. Johansen 2018) and private organisations (Robinson 2017, 
2019).  
4.2. Case-Cleansing and the Required Agility of the Defence Lawyer 
An account of offending in a pre-sentence report following a guilty plea which appears 
not to fully and freely accept guilt and moral responsibility presents a potentially 
socially embarrassing situation for the defence lawyers and most especially for the 
judge who is in charge and is the custodian of justice. Goffman explains: 
[I]f the individual for whom embarrassment is felt happens to be perceived as a 
responsible representative of some faction or subgroup (as is very often the case in 
three-or-more person interaction), then the members of this faction are likely to feel 
embarrassed and to feel it for themselves. (Goffman 1956, 265)  
… At such times the individual whose self has been threatened (the individual for 
whom embarrassment is felt) and the individual who threatened him may both feel 
ashamed of what together they have brought about (…). (Goffman 1956, 268) 
Continuing denial even after a trial can imply a failure, one observed publicly by the 
judge in front of the court community. It may be attributed to the defence lawyer’s 
failure to manage the client. Here a judge explains the problem of an ambiguous 
guilty plea how s/he would “task” the defence lawyer to “put that right”. An 
ambiguous guilty plea, 
can be very unhelpful actually because as you say you’ll have had a plea of guilty, 
or, the case will have gone to trial and he’s been found guilty in all cases in the 
remand court. And then the [pre-sentence] report will indicate a [legal] defence. Now 
that makes life very difficult because I think the [judge] is duty bound in these 
situations where a plea of guilty has been tendered and then it’s made apparent in 
the report that there may be a defence to say to the offender’s agent:6 ‘what is your 
client’s position? Does he want to withdraw the plea of guilty?’ You’ve got to explore 
that once it’s been raised. You can’t just leave it hanging there. It can be 
disadvantageous to the offender where it’s after trial and he is still saying ‘I didn’t do 
it’ (…). But the [defence] agent will almost invariably try and put that right. [Interview 
Westwood Judge 5] 
Following a guilty plea an account in the pre-sentence report in which the defendant 
appears to minimise responsibility or be exculpatory, (or not fully and freely accept 
guilt), presents a socially embarrassing situation most especially for the judge who 
is in charge of the court. The judge is the custodian of justice, and therefore, 
embarrassment which may felt by the judge and is a problem for the defence lawyer 
who could be seen as responsible for having failed to protect the court from the 
embarrassment (cf Goffman 1956, 265-268). Defence lawyers tend to be well aware 
of the potentially embarrassing impact of a defendant’s account which maintains the 
claim of innocence following conviction at a contested trial: 
It’s even worse [than disastrous] when they are found guilty and then are asked to 
give an explanation of the offence [to the pre-sentence report writer] and give the 
exact same explanation as they gave in court when they went to trial, as I had 
recently and the [judge] kept saying: ‘But he’s not admitting it! He’s not admitting 
it!’ And you say, ‘well, well I know because he’s just had a whole trial where he’s 
denied it and he’s giving his position’ (…). ‘He said he respects the decision [of the 
court], but he says he didn’t do it. I can’t really change it for you.’ But this particular 
[judge] went on and on and on about the fact that ‘he said the same thing in the 
[pre-sentence report] as he said in the [trial]’. [Interview, defence lawyer 4] 
To address this potential inconsistency, the defendant is presented with a dilemma if 
she continues to maintain complete factual denial following conviction at an 
evidentially-contested trial. If she continues to deny guilt then she will appear to be 
“in denial”, can expect a higher penalty and be seen as unsuitable for a rehabilitative 
                                                 
6 “Agent” is sometimes used as another term for “defence lawyer”. 
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sentence. If, on the other hand, having maintained a plea of “not guilty” she then 
admits her guilt after the court’s guilty verdict she can expect to be seen as a 
disingenuous time-waster. This dilemma means that the low-risk course of action is 
to plead guilty. Having done so, the defence lawyer must then be vigilant about the 
possibility of an account to the pre-sentence report writer which could appear to the 
court to imply an account of the plea which may appear to the court to be less than 
free and wholly sincere. Here a defence lawyer explains his/her awareness of his/her 
social obligation to manage clients and cleanse ambiguous accounts: 
Sometimes [the client’s account of the incident to the report writer] can present a 
problem (…). The reason I’d be focusing on that is the judge might say to me, ‘well, 
[title and surname of lawyer], you’ve a wee bit explaining here to do. This guy is 
saying that, and I’m thinking about there might have to be a proof of mitigation about 
this.’ So you want to be, you want to avoid that (…) inconsistency between what I’ve 
already told the [judge] and what the guy’s now telling the [the report writer] 
because that, that does kind of present me with a bit of a problem. So I want to see 
that that’s consistent. [Interview, defence lawyer 7] 
Judges observe the role of the defence lawyer in “putting right” an ambiguous 
admission of guilt. In nominally adversarial systems the defence lawyer is the key 
actor. S/he is expected by the court community to persuade the client to 
wholeheartedly admit guilt. Thus, from the perspective of the defence lawyer, it is 
crucial that clients, having formally pled guilty, do not then provide an account to the 
report writer which could be seen by the court to be at odds with that guilty plea. It 
is understood that a central job of the defence lawyer is to manage the accused, her 
expectations, and display an acceptance of legitimacy of the process. As a judge 
explains:  
One of the important things is to try to keep accused persons within the system and 
if at all possible [for them to] see that the disposal is either inevitable or is a 
legitimate sentence, that he accepts it as a legitimate sentence. And there's actually 
quite a lot of man management in the defence agents [i.e. lawyers] and so on 
explaining things and the court explaining to the accused. [Judge 18 Focus Group 6] 
A key way in which the accused persons come to see, and at least be shown to see, 
the sentence as legitimate and accepted is by heralding the opportunity of 
humanisation (and so implied mitigation) of the person. Defence lawyers tend to 
encourage the person to bear in mind that how they present themselves in a pre-
sentence report interview is important and to avoid an account which is at odds with 
the plea of guilty. However, where the person in interview with the report writer 
presents an inconsistent account, the report writers may also play their part in 
cleansing the case of its potentially messy ambiguity. 
4.3. Humanisation Work Cleanses the Defendant’s Account about the Offence 
Incident 
Where a person presents an account of the offence which appears to be inconsistent 
with her formal plea of “guilty”, pre-sentence report writers may, in their report to 
the court, tend to minimise this tension. They may subtly recast the person’s account 
so as to avoid it appearing to be a denial of the earlier guilty plea. By doing so report 
writers may hope to mitigate the sentence and in that way still be true to their 
professional welfare values to “support” the person. Thus, the humanisation work of 
reports simultaneously reconciles the potentially jarring discord between abstract 
ideas of how things should work compared with the everyday reality by cleansing the 
case of its ambiguity about criminal guilt and culpability, while also hoping to mitigate 
the sentence.  
However, sometimes this high-wire balancing act between erasing a denial and 
mitigation of sentence can be miscalculated. In doing so, it may render the person 
more blame-worthy. For example, “Patrick Swan” pled guilty, among other charges, 
to theft and then to a separate (and more serious) charge of possessing of an 
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offensive weapon (“namely a lock-back knife”). In his interview with his report writer 
(“Geena”), it became apparent that Patrick said that he was carrying a screwdriver 
not a knife: 
Patrick was paid back money so he bought some ‘blues’ [valium] with it. He always 
carries a screwdriver with him [Geena later clarified that this was used for stealing] 
in a coat pocket. [Diary, pre-sentence report interview observation]. 
However, in her Report, under Offending History, Geena fudges Patrick’s account in 
such a way that it is not at odds with what he had pled guilty to (carrying a “lock-
back knife”) while not mentioning that he had told her that was only carrying a 
screwdriver: 
Mr [Swan] advised that he had an offensive weapon7 with him when apprehended 
and reported that this weapon was used to access locked areas and that he had no 
intention of using it to harm [any] person. [Pre-sentence report about “Patrick 
Swan”] 
Despite the attempt to argue earnestly for a non-custodial sentence, this 
reconciliation of the inconsistency between Patrick’s formal guilty plea and his 
account about the weapon, means that Patrick is seen to “fit the profile” of a violent 
drug addict. Crucially, it was 
the weapon, which struck me as being not within the, if you like, the parameters of 
chronic drug abuse like theft, stealing, buying drugs. [Focus Group 7, judge 14] 
In other cases, the report writer may cleanse the case of the person’s account 
denying the sincerity of her formal guilty plea, but not quite completely. For example, 
“Carrie Villiers” pled guilty to assaulting a police officer (including biting him); and a 
breach of the peace (public order offence) in a hospital. At interview with her social 
work report writer (“Jodie”), Carrie is asked to explain the offences: 
Carrie leans forward and tells Jodie that she is going to tell her ‘stuff’, but doesn’t 
want it written down (…). On her way [home] the police stopped her for ‘no reason’. 
She struggled as they tried to put her in the car, and she maintains they banged her 
on the head. They however said she had done this. She received a head injury and 
as a result went to the hospital. ‘Why were you shouting?’ Jodie asks. Carrie explains 
that she was being dragged from the police car. She points to her underarms and 
says she was covered in bruises because the police handled her so roughly. ‘They 
were not handling you appropriately?’ Carrie shakes her head: ‘no, they weren’t.’ 
Carrie admits she can’t remember everything that happened, but she ‘wasn’t treated 
right’. She doesn’t know why she was picked up in the first place (…). Regarding the 
assault [she had pled guilty to], Carrie is unsure what happened [she had been 
drinking that night], but she looks shocked by the description of her biting the police 
officer: she ‘didn’t do that!’ Jodie suggests that if she did bite him, there must be 
evidence, and she should speak to her lawyer about that (…). Jodie tells her she 
should not have pled guilty to something she didn’t do. Carrie looks at her: she tells 
her she ‘just wanted to get it out of the way. [Diary, social work report writer 
interview observation, emphasis added] 
In contrast to what Carrie told her, in Jodie’s Report, under the section entitled 
Offending Behavior, Jodie wrote: 
In discussing the matter with Ms Villiers she acknowledges her involvement in the 
offences (…). Ms Villiers states that she was en-route to the taxi rank when the Police 
arrested her. She reported that it was at this time when Police Officers were forcing 
her to enter the Police vehicle that she banged her head to injury and needed medical 
attention (…). Exploring her attitude, Ms Villiers states that she accepts full 
responsibility for the Breach of the Peace and attributes her actions to having been 
under the influence of alcohol. However, Ms Villiers indicated that whilst she pled 
guilty to the offence of Police Assault, she has no recollection of such actions. [SER 
– case 15 Carrie Villiers, emphasis added] 
                                                 
7 In Scots law, both a knife and a screwdriver can be classed as “an offensive weapon”. 
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Thus, pre-sentence report writers play their part in purifying the defendant’s account 
of the offence and guilty plea so as to be mutually consistent, or at least potentially 
consistent. 
However, at times report writers may (unwittingly or not) to include some disruptive, 
dirty ambiguity about legal guilt and moral responsibility. Here, on the one hand, 
having cleansed the case of its ambiguity about the incident with the police, Jodie 
explains that she tries to use report to suggest scepticism about the charges against 
Carrie Villiers (which she has already pled guilty to). In this way, she is staying true 
to her professional penal-welfarist mission to “support” Carrie: 
We move onto the offence account, noting that Jodie has mentioned that Carrie was 
injured entering the police car. Jodie explains that the [judge] would be wondering 
how Carrie ended up in the hospital in the first place (…). She continues that she 
thinks that it is important to tell the [judge] ‘what, where and when’ an event 
happened, to give Carrie’s version of events. Jodie nods and reminds me that Carrie 
was vague about what happened and also did not wish Jodie to mention this in the 
report. However, Jodie feels that by mentioning this, she is not only telling the 
[judge] ‘what happened’, but is also giving the [defence] lawyer an opportunity to 
question what in fact took place that night. Jodie therefore is leaving it open for the 
lawyer to ‘dig this out’. Jodie pulls a face, she isn’t colluding with Carrie or trying to 
write a plea for her, but she feels she is ‘supporting’ her by doing this. If there was 
evidence that Carrie was mishandled, this is for her lawyer to raise this as an issue. 
Similarly in discussing the second offence Carrie has no recollection of what happened 
yet she pled guilty. Jodie then points out that unless the court has evidence that 
Carrie did indeed bite the officer, she shrugs her shoulders. [Diary discussion of Carrie 
Villiers pre-sentence report] 
Jodie is giving the defence the opportunity to “question what in fact took place that 
night.” Jodie is leaving it open “for the lawyer to dig this out”. Jodie questions whether 
the biting took place and wants the court to do so. 
4.4. Humanisation Work Tends to Assist Expeditious Case Disposal 
Importantly, through its effects in cleansing cases of their ambiguities, humanisation 
work may tends to assist, rather than inhibit, instrumental case disposal. Rather than 
slowing the process, pre-sentence investigations are instrumental to the expeditious 
disposal of cases through the courts. Often, lawyers find that reports replace the 
need for any lengthy plea in mitigation. For example:  
Sometimes the [judge] will say to you: ‘There’s a recommendation here for 
probation. Unless you disagree with that, you don’t need to address me.’ And then, 
so it’s a tool to (…) speed up the whole process because it puts everything in context. 
[Interview defence lawyer 10] 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
5.1. The Latent but Profound Effects of Humanisation Work 
Most literature on humanisation tends to view it as the benign hero in the story of an 
otherwise mechanical system. It is seen as a way of correcting and rebalancing a 
process which is too often offence-focused, cursory and mechanical. It tends to be 
seen as a small moment of understanding, humanity, empathy and compassion in a 
brutalising system otherwise oblivious to the unique person. Literature and practice 
concerned to mitigate punishment and prick the conscience of the court invests great 
hope in this moment of compassion and humanity. It heralds a chance to inject a 
degree of substantive and social justice (often called “social context”) into an 
otherwise cold, uncaring system, concerned only with the mechanistic virtues of 
consistency, standardisation, speed and disposal (e.g. Newman and Ugwudike 2013). 
On the other hand, some writers contend, (or even despair), that this work makes 
little real difference. Humanising the person is typically thought to be inversely 
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related to efficiency (Hagan et al. 1979, Ward 2016), or, little more than decorative 
symbolism (Rosecrance 1988).  
My argument differs from both of these claims. It would, of course, be churlish to 
deny that humanisation makes a difference by offering a more rounded and 
contextual picture of the defendant, mitigation and a more lenient sentence may tend 
to result. Yet in doing this, and at the same time, humanisation work plays another 
role: the cleansing of the case of its ambiguity, especially in the defendant’s account 
of culpability. 
In addition to an “ideology of triviality” (McBarnet 1981) and presumption of guilt 
which may envelope dialogue, this paper suggests that we need also to attend to 
humanisation work. How the defendant is seen to relate to the story of the offence, 
tends to be cleansed of its dirty and threatening ambiguities. Implied challenges are 
negated and the defendant’s posture is aligned more closely to that of the “ideal” 
defendant who consents to her impending punishment. Through its promise, 
anticipation, and enactment, humanisation work tends to cleanse the case of its 
generally implied, or (occasionally) explicit, resistance and defiance. The story of the 
defendant is purified of its noxious qualities re-presenting her as a culpable offender 
accepting her deserved punishment.  
Humanisation work does much more than provide a discourse to enable professional 
action to be rationalised and doubts to be explained away. It tends to cleanse cases 
of their unsettling ambiguities, which threaten to pollute the sanctity of venerated 
legal ideas. Humanisation work cleanses and purges cases of potentially unsettling 
ambiguities, implicit or explicit defiance, and anxieties that the defendant is not 
treated humanely and accordance with cherished legal principles. We might go 
further. Does the level of professional confidence in the fairness of justice systems 
depend, at least in significant part, on the ability of humanisation processes to solicit 
the manifestation of active consent of the defendant to her own punishment? 
Showing that the violence of punishment is not questioned, but accepted, converts 
and heads-off the potential for doubt about the validity and fairness of the process 
into confidence and conviction.  
More ideally still, the showing of sincere remorse affirms that the person who is to 
be harmed does not see it is as an act of power or violence, but one which is just and 
deserved “by affirming that the institutions that imposed punishment did so with 
cause” (Weisman 2014, 77). This is why signs of remorse are so widely sought. There 
is no more convincing evidence to the court that the person accepts the fairness of 
the violence to be done to her than the manifestation of authentic remorse. Despite 
the problems of being able to detect the authenticity of remorse in the shadow of 
law’s own power (e.g. Weisman 2009, 2014, Bandes 2015, Rossmanith 2015, 2018), 
the courts must search for it. An authentic performance of remorse is the ultimate 
legitimator of the violence of sentencing. In this most dramatic way, professionals 
can see, hear, and feel (Rossmanith 2015) how completely the person accepts the 
legitimacy of the harm about to be imposed upon her. In fact, the truly remorseful 
subject is seen to accept its legitimacy so completely that she has begun to punish 
herself. Remorse is regarded as the ultimate affirmation of the court’s fairness and 
is the key reason why, even though they can never know whether or not remorse is 
genuine, courts must search for it. 
Court community identities are bound by shared norms, cherished moral values and 
principles. While expeditious case disposal is a collaborative enactment, professional 
court communities coalesce around special, elevated ideas (e.g. free individual choice 
and participation; attendance to the voice of the unique individual freely allowed to 
tell her story). Thus, the validity and compatibility of efficient case disposal goals and 
practices with these elevated principled is always open to doubt. Can what is seen as 
the pragmatic, compromised solution of efficient case disposal be squared with 
inviolable legal principles? This is the question is tested routinely and recursively. It 
is tested through repeated case-by-case practice where a defendant may not appear 
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wholeheartedly to accept factual guilt or moral culpability, or may appear confused, 
contradictory or defiant. In justice regimes regarded by court professionals as fair to 
the defendant, the work of humanisation processes may generally head-off and 
resolve potential hestitation, showing key principles such as participation, consent, 
the presumption of innocence to have been put to the test, and then accepted by the 
defendant. Faith in ideals is more convincing when it is shown to have been 
questioned, tested and revalidated. The boundaries of the shared values of the court 
community can be seen to have been queried and then reaffirmed, fortifying shared 
identity and beliefs. This makes manifest to the professional court community that 
the speedy expeditious case-disposal is in practice compatible with venerated legal 
values.  
5.2. What Humanisation Work Does To and For Professionals 
What, then, are the normative implications of the empirically-focused 
conceptualisation proposed by this paper? One could be tempted to assume a rather 
bleak view of the normative implications. Humanisation work could seem simply to 
be a way of purporting to humanise only in reality to de-humanise. That would be a 
misconception. Humanisation work is very far from necessarily being an empty 
charade or deceit. I have sought to show that aside from its overt work in showing 
the person as a rounded human being, it does latent material work on cases to 
cleanse them of their threatening ambiguities about the person’s posture towards the 
authority of the court. I have sought to explain how successfully performed 
humanisation work reduces ambiguity and the potential hesitation of professionals.  
In doing so this paper offers a different vantage point to view the role of humanising 
processes. Conventionally, humanising processes such as mitigation and treating 
people subject to the law’s force with dignity, respect and listening to their stories 
are regarded as beneficial to those subjects of law. Approaches such as therapeutic 
jurisprudence (e.g. Winnick and Wexler 2003) and procedural justice (e.g. Tyler and 
Huo 2003) reveal how perceptions of fair process can increase a sense of legitimacy 
among those subject to law. By attending carefully to the feelings and dignity of the 
person to be subject to law’s coercion, the pay-off is that they are more likely to 
comply than resist. Without necessarily disputing this argument, this article views it 
through the opposite end of the telescope. It focuses on how professionals perceive 
those subject to the law’s violence feel they are treated. If the elevated moral and 
social status which justice professionals claim means anything, it has to mean that 
at some level they are obliged to see themselves as more than mindless bureaucrats 
processing people through law’s violence and more than simply business people 
solely interested in monetary profit. At the very least the self-identity of the justice 
professional necessitates regarding one’s role as not producing injustice. No judge or 
lawyer can declare callous indifference to just process: to do so would be to invalidate 
their raison d’etre and risk being ostracised by their peers. So it is that sentencing 
and the wider criminal court process must seem fair – or at least not palpably unfair 
– to those carrying out its work especially the violence of sentencing.  
5.3. Normative Implications 
That justice professionals genuinely care about just process and need reassurance 
that the person to be punished has been listened to, treated with dignity and accepts 
her culpability, is in itself, surely no bad thing. To a lesser or greater extent 
professionals demand the reassurance that the process has allowed the person fair 
chance to participate and that she now accepts the imminent violence of punishment. 
In that way the case-cleansing effect produced by humanisation work validates the 
role of the justice professional. This does not mean that professionals are somehow 
cynical or disingenuous. What it means is that they need to be reassured that the 
process is fair.  
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How then, one may ask, should we seek to encourage practices which allow the 
person to be punished to be as humanised as possible? The effects of humanisation 
work is contingent: it can render the subject of sentencing more easily punishable or 
less easily punishable. Humanisation work enquiring about the person’s story, 
listening to her, (including the need to show that the court is listening), can help to 
show the person as a whole and so render her punishment more difficult. What 
features should we look for and which should we avoid? 
In a brilliant analysis of social organisation which enable indifference to suffering, 
Bauman (1989, 208-221) identifies three key arrangements. By thinking about how 
these social arrangements we can sensitise sentencing policy and practices to avoid 
the following three practices of dehumanisation. First, by stretching the distance 
between action and its consequences “moral responsibility belongs to no one in 
particular, as everybody’s contribution to the final effect is too minute or partial (…)” 
Second, by “evicting the face” from “routine human encounter in which the face might 
become visible and glare as moral demand (…) the moral responsibility for the Other 
is suspended and rendered ineffective” (Bauman 1989, 216; see also Levinas 
1961/1991). Third, by rendering the person merely the aggregation of discrete traits, 
actions which are narrowly targeted on those discrete traits ignore the impact on the 
whole human being.  
One of the most important contingent features is perceived distance: remote and 
close interactions. Indifference to suffering is made easier when “stretching the 
distance between action and its consequences beyond the reach of moral impulse (…) 
when actors have to gaze at the consequences of their deeds” (Bauman 1989, 215). 
Thus, distancing the penal subject from the sentencer is likely to render her more 
easily punishable. We have seen how the practice of delegation (e.g. by the court to 
the defence lawyer to the professional probation officer and now to non-professional 
pre-sentence report writers) dilutes the impact and further refracts the intended 
meaning of the person’s story. It also “stretches the distance” between the sentencer 
and the person to be sentenced, so that moral responsibility is diluted and “belongs 
to no one in particular”. The more delegated the communication with the person the 
easier it may be to condemn her, or at least dispose of her case in relative 
indifference. As the late Barbara Hudson would remind us, punishment should always 
be carried out in bad conscience.  
If we want to humanise the subject of sentencing, then the person to be punished 
should be directly communicated with by the person making that decision. The person 
to be sentenced should be able to offer her face-to-face direct narrative 
representation rather than appearing as a disembodied, “de-faced” collection of risk 
factors. For that reason, policies and practices which regard the physical presence of 
and communication with the person to be sentenced as a luxury to be done away 
with in the name of “efficiency” hit a deeper point than they acknowledge. Reforms 
(e.g. remote sentencing where the person who appears by video-link) is indeed more 
“efficient” – not simply in that it saves costs, but also in that it makes sentencing less 
morally challenging than having to face the person to whom one has to do harm. It 
also means that direct and closer communication hold out potential impact on those 
judicial sentences and others involved in determining punishment.  
While procedural and therapeutic approaches emphasise the potential positive impact 
on the person to be punished, we should also ask what is the affective impact on 
those delivering punishment and how this directly compares that with the experiences 
of those sentenced. We still know remarkably little about the perspectives of 
defendants in specific observed cases and how that directly compares in the same 
cases to professional perceptions of defendant experiences. Much of what we think 
we know derives from the perspectives and assumptions of practitioners. We need to 
know more from defendants and, indeed, the extent to which their interpretations 
and perspectives are shared by professionals. Rather than reading-off from 
professionals what they believe sentenced people feel, we should enquire more 
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seriously about the impact on the judge of delegated communication between judge 
and defendant as opposed to direct communication on the judge. For example, does 
more direct communication between defendant and judge tend to yield greater 
empathy, or, can it also result in its own distancing practices? How is “the routine 
case-driven character of judicial work” (Travers 2016, 343) affected and affect 
attempts at closer communicative dialogue? Even if the experience of defendants 
may or may not be to feel more humanised, do judges taking up positions in courts 
intended to enhance closer direct communication (e.g. problem-solving courts) 
change their outlook in sentencing as a result of such work? Do such effects endure?  
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